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Greece is a successor state of the Ottoman Empire with a predominantly Chris-
tian Orthodox population, a member of the Western bloc in the Cold War, and a 
full member of all European political institutions. The country has intimate his-
torical, political and cultural links with three regions: Western Europe, the 
Balkans and the Middle East. Since independence in 1830, a combination of 
Ottoman political traditions and Enlightenment ideas has formed the key frame-
work for state–religion relations.
 Greece is an exception in the context of the secularisation process which has 
characterised much of Western Europe in recent years. In Greece, many people 
do not accept that ‘modernisation’ inevitably means a reduction or denial of a 
significant political role for the Orthodox Church. Under these circumstances, 
what is widely agreed to be a growing political role for religion since the end of 
the Cold War in many parts of the world implies in Greece even greater influ-
ence for certain religious actors. This claim is made not only in relation to 
domestic issues but also in relation to the country’s foreign policy, especially in 
relation to Turkey.
 Over the years, Greek–Turkish relations have been burdened by long- lasting 
political problems, including territorial disputes, such as Cyprus and the 
Aegean, and sovereignty disputes involving minority peoples. Because of his-
torical factors, which led to the formation of the Greek nation- state and the 
emergence of the Autocephalous Church of Greece, two religious institutions 
vie for influence among Orthodox Greeks. These two – the Ecumenical Patriar-
chate and the Church of Greece – have long competed against each other, with 
a significant influence on Greek–Turkish relations. Over time, however, their 
positions have become increasingly bifurcated, especially in the context of the 
post- 1999 rapprochement efforts between the two countries. While the Church 
of Greece, under the leadership of Archbishop Christodoulos, generally took a 
position which did not obviously contribute to peaceful resolution of Greek–
Turkish disputes and arguably helped embed further existing prejudices, the 
Istanbul- based Ecumenical Patriarchate, led by Ecumenical Patriarch Bar-
tholomew, followed a distinctively different line. Although the church was 
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itself a victim of Turkish anti- minority policies, it nevertheless actively pro-
moted Greek–Turkish cooperation, including peaceful resolution of existing 
disputes. As a result, it managed to earn the respect of both international polit-
ical and religious leaders (Williams 2008).
 The contention of this chapter is that the church was able to do this through 
the ability of its leader to wield, what Joseph Nye calls ‘soft power’. In this 
chapter, following Nye, soft power is regarded as:
the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political 
ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of 
others, our soft power is enhanced.
(Nye 2004: ix)
Religious soft power is exercised when religious leaders are able to convince 
their followers through persuasion to adopt certain positions – not only religious, 
but also political and social. Religious soft power may or may not serve religious 
moral values, such as peace, tolerance and conciliation, and may or may not con-
tribute towards conflict resolution and mutual respect. However, it is argued in 
this chapter that religious soft power can be sustainable in the long run only if its 
exercise contributes to the reinforcement of religious moral values. In particular, 
international conflict, which is often underlined by religious difference, appears 
to be a primary policy area where religious soft power could be applied.
 This chapter focuses on the role that the Orthodox Church plays in Greek–
Turkish relations. As already noted, Greece has departed from the European sec-
ularisation trend. This is due to two main factors: first, the residual effect of the 
legacy of the Ottoman millet system, and second, the important position of reli-
gion in the formation, embedding and continuity of Greek nationalism. As a 
result, Greece has followed a distinct modernisation path in which the church 
has played a significant social and political role. Its significance appeared to 
increase after the Cold War. In this chapter we examine Greek–Turkish relations 
in two main contexts: first, the role over time of Orthodoxy in the dispute and, 
second, how the church is able to affect – and sometimes help mould – feelings 
of identity among many Greeks, thanks to the soft power of its leader.
The rise of a bifurcated religious order
Greeks and Turks co- inhabited parts of Southeastern Europe, Anatolia and the 
Eastern Mediterranean for many centuries. Following independence, the Greek 
nation- state turned Orthodoxy into its primary badge of identity. Greece won its 
independence fighting against the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Turk 
became the ‘other’, against which ‘Greekness’ was conceptualised and meas-
ured. However, fully to subordinate Orthodoxy to the interests of the Greek 
nation- state it was necessary to gain clear control over its institutionalised repre-
sentative: the Autocephalous Church of Greece, cut adrift from the Istanbul- 
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based Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1834. It then became the ‘national church’ 
which espoused the ‘Megali Idea’, that is, a nationalist vision aiming to replace 
the Ottoman entity with a Greek Empire, a resuscitation of the Byzantine 
Empire. Meanwhile, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, based in Istanbul, became 
more circumspect. This was not only because of its sensitive position under 
Ottoman jurisdiction, but also because of its unease with the idea of nationalism 
which threatened to undermine the cohesion of its multi- ethnic, multilingual fol-
lowers. As it was, the Ecumenical Patriarchate barely survived the demise of the 
Ottoman Empire and its subsequent replacement by individual nation- states, 
including Turkey. Yet despite its temporal weakness, it managed to maintain a 
strong symbolic role as the spiritual centre of world Orthodoxy and as a custo-
dian of Orthodox cultural heritage. In addition, the ecumenical character of the 
Patriarchate influenced the definition of Greekness. In contrast to the more 
exclusive character of the Greek national identity espoused by the Church of 
Greece, the Patriarchate favoured a more inclusive and tolerant definition of 
Greekness based on culture, not ethnicity. This informed the respective positions 
of both institutions regarding Greek–Turkish relations and later Turkey’s Euro-
pean Union membership bid.
 This study aims to uncover possible explanations for this ambivalence. In 
addition, it aims to examine state–religion relations in Greece in the context of 
secularisation pressures, as well as the role of religious leadership over time. In 
short, it explores links between religion and nationalism in Greece over time. 
Given that nationalism has often used religion as a tool to try to increase cohe-
sion and achieve mass mobilisation, I examine under what conditions religious 
institutions can influence political developments and exercise soft power. In 
addition, I attempt to establish a link between the sustainability of this power 
and the compatibility of policy objectives with Orthodox religious values, 
including peace, toleration and mutual understanding.
Citizenship and religion in Greece
The legacy of the millet1 system which divided the Ottoman society along reli-
gious lines has long been influential in Greece. Religious affiliation became the 
basis of identity formation during the Greek struggle for independence, and 
Orthodoxy was the cornerstone upon which modern Greek national identity was 
built. Ethnic descent and language were much less significant than religion in the 
drawing of dividing lines between Ottoman populations. This was demonstrated 
in the Compulsory Population Exchange Agreement between Greece and 
Turkey, signed in Lausanne on 30 January 1923. In this agreement, both states 
agreed to a mandatory exchange of their minority populations.2 In this exchange, 
the defining criterion of ‘Greekness’ and ‘Turkishness’ was religion. As a result, 
Greek- speaking Muslims from Crete were exchanged with Turkish- speaking 
Orthodox Christians from inner Anatolia. The population exchange was the first 
major step towards the religious homogenisation of the population of Greece. 
The hitherto sizable presence of Muslims was reduced to the province of 
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Western Thrace on the boundary with Turkey and Bulgaria. Soon after, Greece’s 
Jewry was among the worst hit by the Holocaust, with most of the survivors emi-
grating to Israel after the Second World War. This meant that by 1950 Greece had 
a population where around 97 per cent professed Orthodoxy, according to official 
censuses. For many Greeks, this rise in the proportion of Orthodox Christians 
further strengthened the links between Orthodoxy and Greekness. Later, however, 
the end of the Cold War and globalisation opened Greece to the influence of new 
social and economic trends, turning the country from a net exporter to a net 
importer of immigrants. In a similar development to that which occurred in Israel 
at about the same time (see Ben- Porat’s chapter in this collection), this contrib-
uted to a radical change in Greece’s social fabric. Since then, Greece has become 
a multicultural, multi- ethnic society with an immigrant population of approxi-
mately one million out of a total population of about twelve million. Most immi-
grants originate from Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and 
South Asia and do not profess Orthodoxy. Accustomed to a mono- ethnic, 
monoreligious environment, Greek society has had to adapt to this new reality, 
rather in the same way that Israelis have had to adapt to mass immigration from 
the former Soviet Union (see Ben- Porat’s chapter in this collection).
 Under these circumstances, addressing issues of citizenship became very import-
ant. In addition, debate about the role of religion in Greek politics became more 
pronounced from the late 1990s, as the leadership of the Church of Greece argued 
for a more influential role in both politics and society. During his tenure from 1998 
to 2008 Archbishop Christodoulos attempted to expand the public role of the church 
on a large range of issues – including citizenship – and to prevent secularisation. He 
also aimed to expand his authority in relation to the most important institution of 
Orthodoxy, the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Despite the decimation of Istanbul’s 
Orthodox community and the serious problems which hampered its operation,3 the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate has maintained ecclesiastical jurisdiction in parts of the 
Greek territory as well as a strong appeal to the Greek faithful.
The legal basis of state–church relations in Greece
As already noted, religion was a key element in the formation of modern Greek 
national identity. More specifically, Christianity became a de facto condition of 
Greek citizenship. Shortly after the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, 
Article 2§2 of the First Constitution promulgated on 1 January 1822 at the First 
Revolutionary National Assembly in Epidaurus, stated: ‘The autochthonous resi-
dents of the Greek Territory who believe in Jesus Christ are Greeks and enjoy all 
the civil rights without any limitation and difference.’4 Later ethnic criteria were 
added to the religious ones; nevertheless Greek nationalism used Orthodoxy as 
the primary marker of Greek national identity. As a result of this, a special rela-
tionship between the state and the Orthodox Church was instituted. This was 
reflected not only in the country’s Constitution and in many of its laws but also 
in the informal yet strong political position of the church. According to Article 3 
of the Constitution,
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1 The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our 
Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with the 
Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with every other Church of 
Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the holy 
apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is autocephalous and 
is administered by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent 
Holy Synod originating thereof and assembled as specified by the Statu-
tory Charter of the Church in compliance with the provisions of the Patri-
archal Tome of June 29, 1850 and the Synodal Act of September 4, 1928.
2 The ecclesiastical regime existing in certain districts of the State shall 
not be deemed contrary to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
3 The text of the Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered. Official 
translation of the text into any other form of language, without prior 
sanction by the Autocephalous Church of Greece and the Great Church 
of Christ in Constantinople, is prohibited.
(Hellenic Parliament 2001: 18)
Article 13 of the Constitution, which regulates religious freedom, is meant to 
balance the prerogatives of the Orthodox Church, acknowledged in Article 3. 
However, religious freedom is guaranteed for all ‘known religions’ in the fol-
lowing terms:
1 Freedom of religious conscience is inviolable. The enjoyment of civil 
rights and liberties does not depend on the individual’s religious 
beliefs.
2 All known religions shall be free and their rites of worship shall be per-
formed unhindered and under the protection of the law. The practice of 
rites of worship is not allowed to offend public order or the good 
usages. Proselytism is prohibited.
3 The ministers of all known religions shall be subject to the same super-
vision by the State and to the same obligations toward it as those of the 
prevailing religion.
4 No person shall be exempt from discharging his obligations to the State 
or may refuse to comply with the laws because of his religious 
convictions.
5 No oath shall be imposed or administered except as specified by law 
and in the form determined by law.
(Hellenic Parliament 2001: 26)
Also of major significance is the reference to religion in Article 16, which deals 
with education affairs. According to Article 16§2:
Education constitutes a basic mission for the State and shall aim at the 
moral, intellectual, professional and physical training of Greeks, the 
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development of national and religious consciousness and at their formation 
as free and responsible citizens.
(Hellenic Parliament 2001: 30)
The closeness between the Greek state and the Orthodox Church of Greece, reaf-
firmed by this Article, means a privileged position in relation both to other 
Christian confessions and to non- Christian religions. The church was often per-
ceived by state officials and public opinion as part of the state apparatus, while 
bishops have often exceeded their strictly religious duties by making political 
statements on issues such as human rights, education, family policy and foreign 
policy. Church prelates frequently claim to represent the opinion of their flock, 
while often adopting both a nationalistic and an isolationist discourse concerning 
various issues, including: globalisation, European integration, conflict resolution 
and immigration. This trend peaked with the election of Archbishop Christodou-
los in 1998, a figure who attempted to consistently expand the church’s involve-
ment in public affairs.
 The ‘identity card’ crisis was a prime example of his new conceptualisation 
of the greater public role of the Church of Greece (Molokotos- Liederman 2003: 
296–7). Christodoulos opposed the governmental decision to eliminate any ref-
erence to religion in the notion of Greek identity. He organised two major dem-
onstrations against the government’s decision, and about three million Greek 
citizens signed a petition drafted by the church, which demanded a referendum 
on the issue. Although the government did not succumb to these demands, Chris-
todoulos maintained his claim for a major public role for the church, under-
pinned by his great personal popularity, manifested in several opinion polls of 
the time (Mavrogordatos 2003: 130–1). Only a major corruption scandal in the 
Church of Greece in 2005 limited Christodoulos’ popularity, as well as his claim 
to play a major role in Greek politics.
 Before delving into the Church of Greece’s position on Greek–Turkish rela-
tions, it is necessary to provide some information about the history of the rela-
tionship between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Church of Greece.
The historical background
The Ecumenical Patriarchate became the only Eastern Roman (or ‘Byzantine’) 
institution which survived the collapse of the Empire and the fall of Constanti-
nople in 1453. As the Byzantine aristocracy was annihilated, converted to Islam 
or fled to Western Europe, the Patriarchate remained as the sole institutional 
point of reference for the subject Ottoman Christians. The Ecumenical Patriarch 
became the representative of the Ottoman Orthodox Christians in the eyes of the 
Ottoman authorities.5 While the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s jurisdiction in the late 
Byzantine era was sharply contested by the rise of Bulgarian and Serbian medi-
eval kingdoms, in the Ottoman era it managed to expand its jurisdiction in the 
central and western Balkans with the consent of Ottoman authorities. This 
allowed for the accumulation of considerable political power in the hands of the 
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incumbent Patriarch and familiarised the Ottoman Orthodox subjects with the 
idea of clerical rule and the convergence of political and religious authority.6 As 
a result, the Patriarch and his bishops were seen as ex officio political leaders of 
the Ottoman Orthodox Christians. This status was only challenged with the 
advent of the Enlightenment era and the repercussions it caused among the 
Ottoman Orthodox elites, who became exposed to nationalism and secularism. 
The French Revolution inspired a Greek merchant bourgeoisie which mainly 
lived in Ottoman and European cities. Many among such people played an active 
role both in the leadership of the Ottoman Orthodox population and in the organ-
isation of a nationalist republican uprising in the nineteenth century against 
Ottoman rule, whose aim was to establish a secular republican nation- state. Most 
of them adopted nationalism and sought to establish a modern Greek nation- state 
whose primary identity reference point would not be the Orthodox Byzantine 
Empire but Greek classical antiquity.7
 The establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1830 did not provide good 
omens for the continuation of the status quo.8 The government of the new nation-
 state wanted to bring domestic religious expressions under sole control. Reli-
gious control and authority by an institution which was an integral part of the 
Ottoman imperial realm was deemed unacceptable, and the establishment of a 
‘national’ state church became one of the first government priorities. The Regent 
Triumvirate, which was established until the juvenile Bavarian Prince Otto von 
Wittelsbach came of age, proceeded swiftly to sever the ties of the local church 
with the Patriarchate. Headed by the intellectual and priest Theoklitos Farmak-
idis, the Autocephalous Church of Greece was proclaimed in 1834. This com-
prised the first nationalist schism within the Orthodox realm, dealing a grave 
blow to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Relations between the Patriarchate and the 
Church of Greece were restored only with the Patriarchal Tome of 29 June 1850, 
yet the repercussions of the event were felt throughout the nineteenth century. 
The Bulgarian Schism of 1870, the creation of a Bulgarian National Church – 
which appealed to Bulgarian- speaking Orthodox Christians – and the direct chal-
lenge of the Patriarchate’s authority even within Ottoman territories, led in 1872 
to the declaration that nationalism was a heresy (Matalas 2002).
 However, a new status quo emerged following decisive wars between 1912 
and 1922 which caused the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the 
inclusion of former Ottoman provinces and Patriarchal dioceses into Greece. A 
new question then emerged: Would the Patriarchate cede jurisdiction over the 
dioceses of the provinces the Ottoman Empire ceded to Greece? The issue was 
resolved with the Synodal Act of 1928, which acknowledged the tutelary rights 
of the Patriarchate over these dioceses but transferred their administration to the 
Church of Greece. While this arrangement worked for decades, it was challenged 
by Archbishop Christodoulos in the early 2000s. He claimed that the jurisdiction 
of the Church of Greece should coincide with the territory of Greece. This was a 
direct challenge to the 1928 compromise. A serious crisis in the relations of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Church of Greece erupted, only resolved in 
2003 when the Church of Greece withdrew its claims. However, various 
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problems continued to affect their relationship, including: Greek–Turkish rela-
tions, where their positions differed greatly.
The political background
Greek–Turkish relations have long been problematic, for various historical and 
political reasons. Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire, the 
predecessor state of the Republic of Turkey, in 1830. Greece and the Ottoman 
Empire fought wars in 1897 and 1912, while Greece also confronted Turkish 
nationalist forces who later established the Republic of Turkey between 1919 
and 1922. Greek and Turkish forces clashed most recently over Cyprus in 1974. 
Additionally, the formation of Greek and Turkish national identities developed 
in relation to the Muslim Turk or Orthodox Rum- Greek9 identity, which served 
as the quintessential ‘other’. From the time of the 1912 and 1922 wars, the 
Cyprus issue was a source of considerable tension in Greek–Turkish relations, 
especially from the 1950s. The Greek- instigated coup and subsequent Turkish 
invasion of 1974 led to a new status quo deemed unacceptable by the interna-
tional community. Persistent efforts to reunify the divided island on the basis of 
a bizonal, bicommunal federation have, however, so far failed.
 Regarding the Aegean disputes, Greece and Turkey disagree on the extent of 
their territorial waters, continental shelf, airspace, flight information region (FIR) 
and the militarisation of some Greek Aegean islands, while Turkey has recently 
disputed the sovereignty of Greece over several islets and rocks of the Aegean. 
The status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox minority in 
Istanbul and the two Aegean islands and the Muslim minority of Western Thrace 
have also caused considerable tension. Overall, these factors have led to a very 
confrontational environment, with each state perceiving the other as a major 
security threat, leading to a very expensive arms race which served to militarise 
Greek–Turkish land and maritime borders. During the Cold War, Greece priori-
tised the ‘Eastern threat’ (Turkey) over the ‘Northern threat’ (the Soviet bloc) in 
its strategic planning. Greece’s membership of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC; later European Union, EU) in 1981 provided Greek foreign policy 
with additional leverage against Turkey. Thanks to the unanimity rule in EU 
decision- making, any improvement of EEC–Turkey relations became condi-
tional upon Greek consent. This was not given because of the stalemate on the 
Cyprus question and Greek–Turkish bilateral disputes.
 In the 1990s, there were two major crises. In January 1996, Greece and 
Turkey came to the brink of war over the sovereignty of the Imia/Kardak islet in 
the eastern Aegean. In February 1999, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, PKK) and Turkey’s then most wanted person, 
Abdullah Öcalan, was captured by Turkey after having found refuge at the Greek 
Embassy in Nairobi. These two events marked the lowest point in Greek–Turkish 
relations since 1974. Yet things were soon to improve. Through close coopera-
tion between Foreign Ministers George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, a new era 
of Greek–Turkish relations began (Evin 2004: 8–10, 2005: 396–8). The tragic 
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coincidence of two earthquakes, which hit Istanbul and Athens within a month 
of each other in August and September 1999, and the spontaneous support of 
both peoples to the plight of the earthquake victims, suggested that rapproche-
ment efforts might not meet with grassroots opposition. In December 1999, in 
Helsinki, the Council of the European Union named Turkey as a candidate state 
for EU membership (Grigoriadis 2006: 138–45). Greece, which had since its 
EEC membership been the fiercest opponent of an upgrade in EU–Turkey rela-
tions before Greek–Turkish disputes were resolved, became one of the most 
vocal supporters of Turkey’s EU membership. An exponential rise of trade and 
investment between the two countries further strengthened the improved climate 
in Greek–Turkish relations. The initiation of an unprecedented political reform 
process in Turkey aiming at the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria for EU 
membership raised hope among many Greeks that more conciliatory views 
would increasingly prevail on all bilateral issues.
 Nonetheless, Greek–Turkish disputes in the Aegean remained unresolved, 
while no breakthrough was achieved on the issue of the rights of Turkey’s Greek 
minority. Much effort was put into attempts to resolve the Cyprus question, a key 
element in popular perceptions of continued Greek–Turkish conflict (Çarkoğlu 
and Kirişçi 2004: 138–45). In late 2002 a comprehensive United Nations plan 
was offered to both sides on the eve of the island republic’s membership of the 
European Union. Yet in the 24 April 2004 referendum, Greek Cypriots rejected 
the proposed solution of the Cyprus question, which left the Cyprus issue unre-
solved after Cyprus joined the Union in 2004. The change of government in 
Greece in 2004 did not change the official discourse regarding Turkey’s EU 
aspirations. However, as in other EU member states, the debate on Turkey’s 
European or Asian identity and its ability to adapt to European political principles 
has persisted. This debate was also informed by Turkey’s record on protecting the 
rights of its Greek minority and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Soon two lines 
appeared on the issue. The first maintained that efforts to bring Turkey into the 
European Union were in vain and that Turkey was a cultural misfit for the Euro-
pean family. The second insisted that Turkey was eligible for EU membership if 
it fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria like any other member state. In other words, It 
was in Greece’s interest to promote Turkey’s transformation into a fully consoli-
dated democracy, in which minority rights would be fully respected and which 
would help resolve its disputes with its neighbours, such as Greece and Cyprus, 
following negotiations on the basis of international law. Turkey’s EU accession 
process provided a suitable framework for the promotion of greater democracy 
and the resolution of Greek–Turkish disputes. Religious actors also positioned 
themselves on this issue. This was no surprise for the Church of Greece, as Arch-
bishop Christodoulos had repeatedly stated that he reserved the right to intervene 
in the public debate on issues of ‘national significance’ and to speak on behalf of 
the church or ‘the Greek Orthodox nation’. In the case of the Ecumenical Patriar-
chate, which normally avoided any intervention in Greek political affairs, this 
issue was of the utmost significance, as the very existence of itself and the Greek 
minority also depended on the course of EU–Turkey relations.
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The position of the Church of Greece on Turkey’s accession to the 
EU
The Church of Greece under Christodoulos questioned the Greek–Turkish rap-
prochement and opposed Turkey’s membership of the European Union. The line 
followed was essentially a hard- line Greek nationalist one, in which Turkey was 
represented as a quintessentially non- European country which still represented 
an existential threat to both European civilisation and Christianity. Based on 
these assumptions, efforts to promote a Greek–Turkish rapprochement, before 
the resolution of the Cyprus and Aegean disputes according to Greek views were 
treated with suspicion, if not outright hostility, by some bishops. Efforts to 
achieve compromise solutions were deemed to be either naïve or treacherous, as 
Turkey would thus be rewarded for its expansionist agenda and encouraged to 
advance it further. In these talks, Turks were often portrayed as barbaric infidels, 
unable to behave properly, or at best powerless pawns in the hands of an evil 
state. Selective use of history was also made in attempts to corroborate such 
claims. In 2003, Archbishop Christodoulos launched an even more vitriolic 
attack against the Turkish nation during a service in memory of an Orthodox 
saint executed in the Ottoman era:
That is why they [the Turks] impaled him. And now these people want to 
enter the European Union. Barbarians cannot enter the family of Christians. 
We cannot live together. This is not out of malevolence. This is consistency, 
and we should keep it in order not to lose everything in the name of diplo-
macy. Diplomacy is good, but we cannot forget our history . . . Those who 
disagree with us do so because they know no history . . . We cannot forget 
everything and betray the struggles of our fathers.
(Bailis 2003)
Traumatic events in Greek history were repeatedly used to promote a view of an 
unchangeably barbaric Turkey. In numerous cases, Christodoulos referred to the 
killings of Pontic Greeks by Turkish forces in the early twentieth century, accus-
ing foreign powers for their lack of redemption of the victims and reassuring the 
victims that in the end they would be vindicated, adding: ‘We will never forget 
the inextinguishable stigma of the perpetrators.’ Later he also stated: ‘The 
Turkish people is induced by its fanatical leadership and shows baseness and vil-
lainy . . . Let us not believe that Turks can become Europeanised. I am afraid that 
Europe will become Turkified’ (Bailis 2005).
 Such positions were too far- fetched even for the right of the Greek political 
spectrum. Coming under pressure for his openly racialist views in the new polit-
ical environment created by the Greek–Turkish rapprochement efforts, Christo-
doulos followed a more circumspect line in his opposition to Turkey’s EU 
accession. Despite himself opposing European integration, he subscribed to the 
line of leading European federalists who saw Turkey’s potential EU membership 
as a stumbling block to the process of European integration. In that view, the 
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accession of Turkey threatened the very feasibility of the European project, 
because of its relative poverty, size and allegedly ‘non- European’ culture. In late 
2005, when asked in an interview whether he still thought that Turkey should 
not enter the European Union despite the EU decision to start accession negotia-
tions, Christodoulos responded:
I think what is more important than the opinions of religious leaders is the 
clearly negative position on this issue [Turkey’s EU membership] of para-
mount and historical figures of the European community such as Giscard 
d’Estaing and Jacques Delors. Even more important is the opinion of the 
European – as well as the Greek – citizens, who in recent polls have over-
whelmingly opposed Turkey’s EU membership. We should also not forget 
that the rejection of the European Constitution in big countries such as 
France and Holland is said to have occurred to express the opposition of the 
European public opinion to that possibility. Nowadays, many political ana-
lysts and intellectuals express the concern that instead of Europeanising 
Turkey, we may end up Turkifying Europe. There is no need to add any-
thing else.
(Christodoulos 2005)
His rhetoric and opinions could not go unaddressed in Turkey. Columnists 
fiercely reacted to his harsh attacks against Turkey and Turks, calling him a 
‘psychopath’, contrasting his intemperate comments with the new era of Greek–
Turkish relations at both political and social levels. In the words of Oktay Ekşi, 
a major columnist on the popular Turkish daily Hürriyet:
The Turkish and the Greek people want to forget the bad memories of the 
past. And they actually did. But the church cannot accept that. To tell the 
truth, we cannot understand this. Does the church exist as religious institu-
tion to spread love or hate and animosity?
(Ekşi 2004)
Addressing a significant political audience in Greece, Christodoulos did not 
defend Christian principles but Greek nationalist stereotypes against Turkey. He 
used his persuasive powers – arguably a form of religious ‘soft power’ – in order 
to try to rekindle old animosities and instil fear and animosity in relation to con-
tinuing rapprochement efforts. This served to relegate him to the level of a fringe 
political figure, who enjoyed strong sympathy from a few but also strong criti-
cism from many others. This had the effect of severely limiting his soft power 
potential, not least because his forcefully expressed opinions appeared to many 
to be in direct contrast to what were widely understood to be universal religious 
principles, such as peace, toleration and reconciliation.
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The position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate
The position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on Greek–Turkish relations was dia-
metrically different. Following a line of reconciliation, it defended the need for 
dialogue and cooperation between Greece and Turkey. This position also fitted 
the Christian virtues of toleration and peace- building. In an interview in the 
Greek daily newspaper Eleftherotypia in 1999, Ecumenical Patriarch Bar-
tholomew stated:
This is our principle, peace and brotherhood of humans and peoples. This 
principle also refers to Greek–Turkish relations. We have repeatedly taken a 
position on Greek–Turkish relations . . . We have always supported the need 
for good neighbourly relations, friendship and cooperation between the two 
peoples . . . Because of that position we have been criticised by a part of the 
Greek press. Nonetheless, we will not cease to fervently support the good 
neighbourly relations and cooperation of Greece and Turkey for the benefit 
of both peoples.
(Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I 1999)
This statement was not well received by Greek nationalists inside and outside 
the Church of Greece, as it appeared that one of the foremost victims of Turkish 
nationalist policies, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, was taking both a conciliatory 
and a moderate position on Greek–Turkish relations. As a result, Bartholomew 
was accused of ‘supporting Turkish and not Greek interests’, while some col-
umnists suggested the transfer of the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate from 
Istanbul to Greece. Thessaloniki, Mount Athos and the island of Patmos were – 
at times – suggested as possible seats (Giannaras 1999). On this issue, Greek and 
Turkish nationalist circles were in harmony, as several Turkish nationalist 
groups demanded the expulsion of the Patriarchate from Turkey (Kerinçsiz 
2006). They were especially annoyed by the Patriarch organising Masses in 
abandoned churches throughout Anatolia (Yıldırım and Tuna 2006).
 Bartholomew’s attempt to propose a new approach for Greek minority ques-
tions was of major significance in this context. The Patriarchate did not ignore 
the persistent violations of its rights and the rights of the Greek minority. Tur-
key’s European perspective was thus perceived as the only realistic hope for 
improvement in the field of minority rights, which could benefit not only the 
dwindling Greek minority of Istanbul but also the Ecumenical Patriarchate itself. 
Being a victim of Turkish minority discrimination policies, the Patriarchate was 
naturally interested in the democratic reform process, which would, it was 
expected, include provisions for the protection of minority rights and the restitu-
tion of past injustices. This entailed careful screening of the reform process and 
criticism in the cases where insufficient progress was made. Closure of the reli-
gious seminary in Heybeliada (Chalki) became one of the key issues in the 
reform process. Turkey’s refusal to allow the reopening of the seminary was one 
of the clearest manifestations that the reform process still faced serious short-
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comings (Grigoriadis 2008: 36). However, positive steps were also recognised, 
including Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, which would necessarily 
involve complete resolution of all minority problems, including those related to 
the Greek minority. Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe in early 2007, Bartholomew explained:
At this point, we must mention that the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the sur-
rounding Greek- Orthodox minority in Turkey feel that they still do not 
enjoy full rights, such as the refusal to acknowledge and recognise a legal 
status to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the prohibition of the operation of the 
Theological School of Chalki, property issues and many more. We do rec-
ognise, however, that many reforms have been made and some remarkable 
steps have been taken for the accession of the internal law towards the Euro-
pean standard. Therefore, we have always supported the European perspec-
tive of Turkey in anticipation of the remaining steps to be taken according 
to the standards of the European Union.
(Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I 2007)
Turkey’s convergence with EU standards on minority rights was presented not 
as a concession but as something essentially beneficial for the country. Recog-
nising the rights of the Patriarchate and the Greek minority would not only pose 
no threat for Turkey, it would also benefit it, as this would comprise a clear man-
ifestation of the maturity of its democracy. Referring to the issue of the Chalki 
Seminary in 1999, Bartholomew argued:
We will not cease to wish that Turkey realises that the reopening of the 
Chalki Religious Seminary not only does not harm its interests, but will be 
on the contrary to its benefit. Orthodox and non- Orthodox youth will come 
to study here . . . When they return to their home countries and take over 
responsible positions, they will boast of having studied at the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and the historic Chalki School, in modern Turkey, in which 
religious freedom is so protected that it allows for the operation of such a 
Christian Seminary, although the vast majority of its population is Muslim.
(Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I 1999)
On this issue, Bartholomew sided with many among the Turkish liberal intelligent-
sia who fervently supported the EU reform process and did not see it as antithetical 
to Turkish national security interests (Birand 2007). In fact, many reformist intel-
lectuals in Turkey suggested a new definition of Turkish national interest, with 
acknowledgment of minority rights henceforward not perceived as a major threat 
to Turkish security. On the contrary, such a development might actually improve 
Turkish security, as minority members would eventually feel themselves to be 
respected as citizens of the Republic of Turkey (Grigoriadis 2007: 431–2).
 Nonetheless, perhaps the most impressive statement made in that interview 
referred to the issue of nationalism. Bartholomew reminded the interviewer of 
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the 1872 synodal decision which had declared ‘nationalism’ as heresy and 
pointed to what he regarded as the fundamentally anti- Christian nature of nation-
alist ideologies:
We would like to remind [you] that nationalism has been condemned by the 
Church as ‘heresy’ . . . The revival of nationalism is a burning contemporary 
question, as it is directed against Orthodoxy and Christianity in general, 
even when the Christian and in general the religious element is presented as 
a means to further nationalist goals. Nationalism isolates the peoples, directs 
them against each other, while the quintessence of Christianity is love and 
brotherhood of peoples. The unity of humankind is one of the basic mes-
sages of Apostle Paul and the whole Church, as well as the finding of true 
philosophical and biological thought. From that perspective, racism has 
been worldwide condemned and is related to nationalism, from which, 
though, one should differentiate laudable patriotism.
(Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I 1999)
This position was an explicit condemnation of Greek and Turkish nationalism 
from a theological vantage point, which clearly dissonated with the stance of the 
Church of Greece on the same issue. Bartholomew chastised divisive and intol-
erant elements apparently inherent to all nationalisms. This could only cause 
major surprise in large parts of Greek public opinion, which had been familiar-
ised with the identification of Orthodoxy and Greek nationalism and the depic-
tion of Orthodoxy as Greece’s ‘national religion’. In response to the divisive 
effects of nationalism, Bartholomew suggested interreligious dialogue as the 
means to bring about convergence, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.
That however which is accomplished fluently through interreligious dia-
logues is the cultivation of a spirit of tolerance, reconciliation and peaceful 
coexistence of the faithful of the various religions, free from fanaticism and 
phobias. Contrary to political positions that many times foster the spirit of 
conflict and confrontation, catching thus within it both victims and victimis-
ers, we try and pursue sowing the spirit of equal rights and responsibilities 
for all and for their peaceful cooperation, independently of their religion. 
For only through the opening of hearts and minds and the acceptance of 
one’s difference as an equal value to our own is it possible to build peace in 
this world.
 There is one more accomplishment and goal of the interreligious dia-
logues that is not of any less importance. This is the enrichment of the mind 
and perception of each faithful by considering things through the religion of 
somebody else. This enrichment releases us from partiality; it allows us to 
have a higher and wider understanding of beliefs; it fortifies the intellect and 
very often it leads us to a deeper experience of the truth and to a very 
advanced level of our growth in the presence of the divine revelation.
(Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I 2007)
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This message referred not only to the Greek–Turkish conflict, which is to some 
degree informed by religious differences, but also to the wider divide perceived 
to exist between the ‘West’ and the ‘Islamic world’. Bartholomew has also been 
vocal on this issue. For example, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has frequently 
organised events promoting interreligious dialogue with emphasis on issues such 
as the environment. These have included various symposia on environmental 
protection, including one on board a vessel on the Amazon river in July 2006 
and another held in Greenland the following year. Interlocutors have included 
major figures of Islam in Turkey, including Fethullah Gülen and leaders of 
American Jewry such as Chief Rabbi David Rosen, President of the International 
Jewish Committee on Interreligious Consultations. Overall, such activities have 
earned Bartholomew great respect while increasing his international influence, in 
contrast to his continuing weak domestic position in Turkey.
Explaining the difference
Such a sharp difference between the approach of the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
and the Church of Greece on Greek–Turkish relations can be explained by allu-
sion to various factors. First, we can point to an instrumentalist explanation for 
the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. That is, the Patriarchate and Tur-
key’s Greek minority have both paid a very high price because of the long- term 
tension in Greek–Turkish relations. It is no coincidence that the decline of the 
Greek minority population in Turkey was positively correlated with the emer-
gence and escalation of the Cyprus question after the Second World War. Dis-
criminatory measures and attacks against Turkey’s Greeks were seen in both 
Turkey and Greece as a form of ‘retaliation’ against anti- Turkish Cypriot inci-
dents in Cyprus between the 1950s and 1970s. This brought Turkey’s Greek 
minority to the brink of extinction and the Ecumenical Patriarchate under unprec-
edented pressure, as it became unable to manage its property or educate its clergy 
while facing serious difficulties in performing even its most basic functions. It 
was hoped that improvement of Greek–Turkish relations would help defuse the 
pressure traditionally exerted on Turkey’s Greek minority and the Patriarchate 
and also pave the way for Turkey’s European integration, as Greece, historically 
the biggest opponent of the improvement of EEC–Turkey relations, became an 
ardent supporter of Turkey’s EU membership. Shortcomings in minority rights 
protection, however, never distanced the Patriarchate from the strategic target of 
Turkey’s European integration. A European Turkey, with a thriving economy and 
a fully democratic political system, would, it was believed, be a much more suita-
ble host country for an institution of the international stature of the Patriarchate.
 Nonetheless, instrumentalist reasoning is insufficient to explain overall the 
position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on Greek–Turkish relations. One also 
needs to consider the role of leadership and agency. At the theological level, 
Bartholomew consistently advocated the Christian principles of toleration, peace 
and reconciliation against Greek or Turkish nationalism. He also realised that the 
European Union was a political project, which stood for the reconciliation of the 
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European peoples and the overcoming of nationalist conflicts in the European 
continent. He understood that Turkey’s EU membership could greatly contribute 
not only to the reconciliation of Turkey with Greece, but also to the much greater 
task of building bridges between Muslims and Christians. This position gained 
Bartholomew greater international respect and recognition, manifested for 
example in May 2008, when he was included in the Time magazine annual list of 
the world’s 100 most influential people. The Archbishop of Canterbury and 
Head of the Anglican Church, Rowan Williams, justified the Time decision as 
follows:
Patriarch Bartholomew, however, has turned the relative political weakness 
of the office into a strength, grasping the fact that it allows him to stake out 
a clear moral and spiritual vision that is not tangled up in negotiation and 
balances of power. And this vision is dominated by his concern for the 
environment.
(Williams 2008)
In addition, while Turkish authorities insisted on viewing him as the religious 
leader of a tiny religious minority of Turkey, Bartholomew was officially 
received and visited by heads of states, prime ministers and religious leaders 
throughout the world. In this regard, it is appropriate to mention, for example, 
his visit to the United States in March 2002, when he was received by the US 
president with head- of-state honours.
 As regards the Church of Greece, one needs to consider its growing political 
voice in order to understand its position on Greek–Turkish relations. The 
increased political voice of the Church of Greece has followed its closer affili-
ation with the state. Church officials felt empowered to make their positions 
known on a range of political issues, which – in most cases – resembled posi-
tions taken by parties on the far right of the Greek political spectrum, such as the 
Popular Orthodox Rally (Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos, LAOS). This trend 
became stronger under Archbishop Christodoulos. The adoption of a populist, 
nationalist and xenophobic agenda was condemned by a large part of the Greek 
intelligentsia, while having considerable appeal among many conservative voters 
who saw Christodoulos as a political leader who did not hesitate to defend nar-
rowly defined Greek national interests at all costs. In that context, Greek–Turkish 
rapprochement efforts were often seen as a foreign ploy to promote a fake recon-
ciliation between Greece and Turkey at the expense of Greek national interests. 
Given the key role Orthodoxy has played in the formation of Greek national 
identity, Christodoulos was eager to play a leading role in Greek nationalist 
mobilisation. The conciliatory stance of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was con-
veniently ignored or undermined, regarded as a product of foreign pressure or 
even as ‘treason’. Christodoulos’ political agenda allied him with the right of the 
Greek political spectrum, and this inevitably meant his identification with this 
strand of Greek public opinion on the issue of Greek–Turkish rapprochement. 
The conflation of religion with nationalism, populism and direct political 
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involvement may have led to short- term political gains and appeal among a part 
of Greek population, but in the long term it helped to undermine his religious 
soft power. In other words, his ability was reduced to influence and persuade 
more widely, by setting a moral paradigm based on religious principles.
 The failure of this policy was implicitly accepted by the prelates of the 
Church of Greece. After the death of Archbishop Christodoulos in January 2008 
the Holy Synod elected Bishop Ieronymos as his successor. The new Archbishop 
was the best- known opponent of Christodoulos’ strategy to claim a key political 
role for the church, including issues of foreign policy generally and 
Greek–Turkish relations specifically. In his enthronement speech, Ieronymos 
underlined that he was an ecclesiastical leader and not a politician. In the first 
months of his tenure, he followed a line distinctly different from that of his pred-
ecessor. He refrained from interventions in foreign policy affairs – including 
Greek–Turkish relations and Turkey’s EU candidacy – and restricted his activity 
to strictly religious issues. One of the first tasks was notably the restoration of 
good relations between the Church of Greece and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 
His appointment also raised hopes that a reconsideration of the relationship 
between the Greek state and the Church of Greece was possible.
Conclusions
Given the strong imprint of Orthodoxy on the definition of Greek national iden-
tity, the divergent positions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Church of 
Greece on Greek–Turkish relations illustrate how both institutions have over 
time suggested alternative versions of what it means to be Greek. The Church of 
Greece under Christodoulos saw the continuation of Greek–Turkish rivalry as a 
substantial part of Greek national and Orthodox religious identity and opposed 
any rapprochement efforts and Turkey’s EU integration. The Ecumenical Patri-
archate, however, did not consider Greek–Turkish conflict as a defining element 
of Greek identity. A more inclusive, tolerant version of Greekness was champi-
oned, which was not built on animosity towards Turkey. Instead, this stance 
highlighted the potential merits of Turkey’s EU accession for both Greeks and 
Turks, including the key prize of resolution of existing disputes between the 
countries. In addition, it became clear how the interaction between the Greek 
state and the Orthodox Church could very easily facilitate the instrumentalisa-
tion of religion for nationalist purposes in foreign policy- making. This highlights 
how state- affiliated religious actors may side with state positions, which in some 
cases are characterised by both nationalist bias and a realist, bleakly Hobbesian, 
view of international relations.10 Under these circumstances, religious actors may 
behave more like state officials or politicians promoting state interests or the 
views of their own political clientele, rather than encouraging conflict resolution, 
peace and toleration. On the other hand, lack of links with a state may be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of positions loyal to 
religious principles such as peace and conciliation. Lack of alignment with state 
interests allows for the adoption of different positions on issues of foreign 
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policy, which may be closer to a cooperative Kantian view of international 
relations.
 The autonomy of religious institutions from the state apparatus may be con-
sidered as an additional reason for their support for conflict resolution and recon-
ciliation. Under these conditions, religious leaders may underplay the importance 
of secular nationalist concerns and address foreign policy questions on the basis 
of religious principles. Moreover, we also need to address the importance of 
agency. For example, the personality of a religious leader can have a major 
impact on the formation of the position of the religious institution on various 
issues, including foreign policy. Finally, it appears that in the long run success in 
the use of religious soft power depends on consistent adherence to clear religious 
principles. Consistency between political goals and religious principles may lead 
to enduring or even increasing soft power of religious actors. Religious actors 
who prefer to serve a radical political agenda and make policy choices inconsist-
ent with religious values such as peace, toleration and conciliation may have to 
face a decrease of their ability to persuade wide segments of the society that their 
position is one they should support. Judging by the evidence presented in this 
chapter, viewing religion as an agent of pacification and conflict resolution is not 
only consistent with religious principles, but also may earn considerable reli-
gious, social and political appeal.
Notes
 1 The millet system was the main political framework according to which the Ottoman 
Empire ruled its subjects, based on their religious affiliation. On this see Braude 
(1982).
 2 For more on this, see Hirschon (2003).
 3 Among several grievances, one could highlight the official rejection of the Patriar-
chate’s ecumenical character and legal personality. This included the legal personality 
of numerous Orthodox pious religious foundations. This paved the way for systematic 
confiscations and usurpations of immovable assets.
 4 Interestingly there was no differentiation between Orthodox and Catholic Christians, 
despite the identification of the Rum millet with Orthodoxy. Apparently this stance 
aimed to co- opt the Greek- speaking Catholic population of the Aegean, as well to 
avoid antagonising the Western powers. However, the identification of Greek national 
identity with Orthodoxy became clear following independence in 1830.
 5 For more information on the millet system, see Braude (1982).
 6 The case of Cyprus and the religious–political rule of Archbishop Makarios from the 
1950s to the 1970s is a highly indicative late survival of the Ottoman convolution of 
religious and political authority.
 7 The doyen of Greek Enlightenment, Adamantios Korais, was a primary advocate of 
such ideas.
 8 For more information on the relations between Greek nationalism and the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate in the nineteenth century, see Matalas (2002).
 9 The term Rum included all the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, regardless 
of their ethnic origin and language. The term ‘Greek’ referred to the Orthodox sub-
jects which embraced the Greek nationalist project.
10 For a comparison between Hobbesian and Kantian approaches to Greek–Turkish dis-
putes, see Kirişçi (2002).
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